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Section 230’s Liability Shield in the
Age of Online Terrorist Recruitment
INTRODUCTION
From its outset, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS)1 has relied on social media to amass followers and gain
strength.2 While it used to be time-consuming and costly to
recruit someone to terror, Twitter, Inc. (Twitter) has provided an
avenue through which fighters can upload photos in real time of
what they are doing to encourage more people to join their
cause.3 Rather than calling on supporters to fight on the front
lines, ISIS uses the digital services that have become part of
daily life4 to attract followers who will wage jihad at home.5 ISIS
propaganda is “crafted not just to stir the hearts of potential
recruits but also to boost the organization’s ghastly brand—to
reinforce Westerners’ perceptions of the Islamic State and its
devotees as ruthless beyond comprehension.”6 ISIS also uses
social media to highlight the “lighter side of life in ISIS.”7 One
1 ISIS “is a militant Sunni movement that has conquered territory in western
Iraq, eastern Syria, and Libya, from which it has tried to establish the caliphate,
claiming exclusive political and theological authority over the world’s Muslims.” Zachary
Laub, The Islamic State, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (last updated Aug. 10, 2016), http://
www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811 [https://perma.cc/PPZ2-69HP].
2 See P.W. Singer & Emerson Brooking, Terror On Twitter How ISIS is Taking
War to Social Media—and Social Media is Fighting Back, POPULAR SCI. (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.popsci.com/terror-on-twitter-how-isis-is-taking-war-to-social-media [https://
perma.cc/9RV5-5AAY]. ISIS “is content to crowdsource its social media activity—and
its violence—out to individuals with whom it had no concrete ties . . . [and] it does so
openly in the West’s most beloved precincts of the Internet . . . .” Brendan I. Koerner,
Why ISIS is winning the social media war, WIRED (Apr. 2016), https://www.wired.com/
2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat [https://perma.cc/Y7D3-GAB9]; Telegraph
Reporters,HowTerroristsAreUsingSocialMedia, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 4, 2014, 4:02PM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11207681/How-terrorists-are-using-soc
ial-media.html [https://perma.cc/EX5X-BJDM].
3 See Bruce Auster, Drawn by Twitter and Trained in Syria, Terrorists Could
Turn West, NPR (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/02/28/283999741/drawn-by-
twitter-and-trained-in-syria-terrorists-could-turn-west [https://perma.cc/NL6X-MDXP].
4 Koerner, supra note 2.
5 See Singer & Brooking, supra note 2; see also Koerner, supra note 2. Jihad
is “a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; also: a personal struggle in
devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline.” Jihad, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad [https://perma.cc/9ZWN-9B2V].
6 Koerner, supra note 2.
7 Singer & Brooking, supra note 2.
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attempt to bolster its online image was ISIS’s “Cats of Jihad”
campaign where ISIS fighters took pictures of their cats posing
with weapons.8
Though Twitter has responded to this trend by
suspending thousands of accounts with suspected terrorist
links,9 socialmedia companies have generally taken a “laissez-faire
approach” to preventing terrorists from using their platforms to
promote their illegal agendas, even as their audiences continue to
grow.10 “The sad truth is that extremists have been more agile,
aggressive and insidious in their use of social media platforms than
governments and the private sector have been in tracking, stopping
and preventing them from hijacking the online world.”11 Indeed,
ISIS foot soldiers continue to upload amateur videos and images
daily.12 Those videos are then shared throughout the world both
by “ordinary users” as well as by “mainstream” news outlets.13
In fact, a social media monitor found that ISIS created hype
about itself and what it stands for by using hashtags that
focused on group messaging and by branding “700,000 accounts
[that] discuss[ed] the terrorist group.”14
In recent years, terrorist attackers are often motivated to
violent action in part by social media propaganda.15 In November
8 Id.
9 SeeNickyWoolf, Twitter Suspends 235,000 Accounts in SixMonths for Promoting
Terrorism, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016, 2:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/aug/18/twitter-suspends-accounts-terrorism-links-isis [https://perma.cc/GV4E-29FM].
10 Why it’s so hard to fight extremist propaganda online, PBSNEWSHOUR (Sept. 7,
2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/hard-fight-extremist-propaganda-online [https://
perma.cc/P2ZW-ETL5] [hereinafter Why it’s so hard to fight extremist propaganda online].
Although there is evidence that ISIS is losing territory and, thus, posting less to social media,
the economic advantages of recruiting new members online suggests that this issue can and
will persist even if ISIS is defeated. The ISIS Propaganda Slowdown, ON THEMEDIA (Oct.
14, 2016), http://www.wnyc.org/story/isis-propaganda-slowdown [https://perma.cc/GZU5-
RJTF] [hereinafter The ISIS Propaganda Slowdown].
11 Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114 Cong. 7
(2015) (page 2 of linked written statement of The Hon. Mark D. Wallace, CEO, Counter
Extremism Project, https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/10-28-2015-
Natl-Security-Subcommittee-Hearing-on-Radicalization-Wallace-CEP-Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QWH5-KZN3]) [hereinafter Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise
of Terrorism].
12 Telegraph Reporters, supra note 2.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See Katie Bo Williams, Terror experts puzzled by ISIS claim in Las Vegas attack,
HILL (Oct. 2, 2017, 5:24 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/353518-terror-experts-
puzzled-by-isis-claim-in-las-vegas-attack [https://perma.cc/D4VP-6HGF]. Indeed, even when
there is no evidence of terrorist connections, the pervasive nature of ISIS social media accounts
has allowed ISIS to take credit for terrorist attacks, even if authorities later show that theywere
not in fact responsible for the violence. Examples of this include ISIS taking credit for an attack
on a casino inManila, and claims that ISIS both planted bombs at Charles de Gaulle Airport in
France and inspired Stephen Paddock—the shooter in the tragic Las Vegas attack. Id.
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2015, Anwar Abu Zaid, a “lone wolf” representative of ISIS shot
and killed two government contractors on an American base in
Jordan.16 Abu Zaid had been moved to terror after watching a
video ISIS posted in February 2015 of an execution of a
Jordanian pilot.17 Also in November 2015, more than 100 people
in Paris were killed in an attack coordinated by ISIS.18 The
attackers in that instance were radicalized in Europe, and one
even attempted to travel to Yemen to fight after he became
inspired watching extremist preachers on the Internet.19 In June
2016, Omar Mateen killed forty-nine people at a Florida night
club.20 Prior to the attack, Mateen downloaded videos of ISIS
beheadings.21 Throughout the three hours he spent in the club
before police shot and killed him, Mateen searched for social
media references to ISIS and pledged his allegiance to ISIS in
conversations with the police.22
In the wake of each of those attacks, the families of some
of the victims sued social media companies like Twitter and
Facebook, Inc. (Facebook).23 The litigants alleged that the social
media platforms provided material support to ISIS in violation
of a civil provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)24 since the
companies profited from advertisements that ran against the
terrorist propaganda.25 Courts have found organizations to be
16 Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
17 Id.
18 Adam Nossiter & Rick Gladstone, Paris Attacks Kill More Than 100, Police Say;
Border Controls Tightened, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/
world/europe/paris-shooting-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/5NKL-BAQX]. One of the gunmen
in the concert hall shouted, “What you are doing in Syria, you are going to pay for it now.” Id.
19 Missy Ryan, Emily Badger, & William Booth, 9 young men and their paths
to terror in Paris, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
9-young-men-and-their-paths-to-terror-in-paris/2015/11/21/edc19464-8ee6-11e5-934c-
a369c80822c2_story.html [https://perma.cc/R8FS-7SW2].
20 Gal Tziperman Lotan, Families of Three Pulse Victims Sue Facebook,
Twitter, Google, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/os-
pulse-social-media-lawsuit-20161220-story.html [https://perma.cc/VHN9-CCHN].
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally Complaint, Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. 2:16-cv-14406
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2016), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Crosby v. Twitter Complaint];
Amended Complaint, Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., Docket No. 16-cv-4453 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
2016), ECF No. 17; Complaint, Gonzalez v. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. 4:16-cv-03282 (N.D.
Cal. June 14, 2016), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Gonzalez v. Twitter Complaint]; First
Amended Complaint, Fields v. Twitter, 200 F. Supp. 2d 964 (16-cv-00213-WHO), 2016
WL 2586763, ECF No. 21 [hereinafter Fields First Amended Complaint].
24 Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003(a)(4), 106 stat. 4506,
4522 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012)); see also supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
25 Cyrus Farivar, It’ll be Very Hard for Terrorism Victim’s Family to Win Lawsuit
Against Twitter, ARS TECHNICA (June 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2016/06/itll-be-very-hard-for-terrorism-victims-family-to-win-lawsuit-against-twitter [https://
perma.cc/V8CW-7F9F]; Chris Castle, Live From YouTubeistan: Google Still ProvidingMaterial
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liable under the ATA based on evidence that the defendants knew
that their funds were being used to conduct acts of terrorism—even
if the defendants did not intend for their funds to be used in such a
way.26 Though Twitter, Facebook, and Google may not be giving
money to terrorist groups, per se, they are giving terrorist groups
a platform to spread their violent rhetoric and they are profiting
from those groups’ presence on their websites.
Despite the purposes of the ATA, the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) has served as an impenetrable shield
preventing litigants from successfully bringing suit against
social media companies. On August 10, 2016, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims in Fields v. Twitter,27 holding that the CDA’s
liability shield for publishers barred the claims.28 Section
230(c)(1) of the CDA provides a safeguard for interactive service
providers (ISPs), preventing them from “be[ing] treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”29 Because of Section 230(c)(1),
ISPs are immune from liability when a third party posts content
on the ISP’s platform and the ISP does not edit or modify that
content.30 Thus, victims’ families were unable to seek the legal
redress that the ATA was enacted to provide.
Although courts have addressed the Section 230(c)
liability shield in other contexts,31 Fields appears to be the first
case brought under the ATA where a court used the shield to bar
a claim against an ISP.32 It will be more difficult for future
plaintiffs to hold social media companies liable for objectionable
content because of the Fields court’s holding.33 An amendment
Support for ISIS,MUSICTECHPOL’Y (Apr. 28, 2015), https://musictechpolicy.com/2015/04/28/
live-from-youtubeistan-google-still-providing-material-support-for-isis [https://perma.cc/
DR5N-82A9].
26 See, e.g., Stephen J. DiGregoria, If We Don’t Bring Them To Court, The
Terrorists Will Have Won: Reinvigorating the Anti-Terrorist Act and General Jurisdiction
in a Post-Daimler Era, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 357, 378 (2016).
27 Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
28 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110
Stat. 56 137–38 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); Fields, 200 F. Supp. 2d at
966.
29 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)) (defining “information content provider”).
30 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
31 See, e.g., Jane Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016)
(violation of anti-sex-trafficking laws); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th
Cir. 2016) (negligent failure to warn); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (intentional assault); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)
(defamation and negligent undertaking); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (fair housing laws).
32 See Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 970; see also 18 U.S.C.A. 2333(a) (West 2016).
33 Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 966–70; Farivar, supra note 25.
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to Section 230(c) precluding the liability shield’s use in cases
brought pursuant to the ATA would remedy this issue. Such an
amendment is proper because nothing in Section 230’s text or
history suggests that Congress intended to immunize ISPs from
liability in cases related to terrorist activity.34 Further, the legal
landscape must be changed to diminish terrorist organizations’
abilities to attract and recruit members online in order to fully
protect the American public and prevent future attacks.
Part I of this note briefly reviews the CDA’s history and
discusses how courts have applied Section 230. It recounts how
the Fields court used the liability shield to arrive at its decision
and analyzes how Fields will impact future cases. Part II
discusses amending Section 230 and concludes that the
amendment would survive a First Amendment challenge. Part
III identifies policy issues that will continue to persist even if the
government is able to limit speech by terrorist organizations
through social media. While there are legitimate policy concerns,
the potential benefits of the expanded scope of Section 230 far
outweigh the potential harm of continuing to shield social media
companies from liability under the ATA.
I. SECTION 230’S LIABILITY SHIELD AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOCIALMEDIA COMPANIES
Section 230 of the CDA was enacted to ensure that ISPs
would be able to develop a free Internet.35 To accomplish this
goal, legislators included a provision shielding ISPs from
liability for illegal content users posted on ISP platforms.36
Courts have interpreted Section 230 broadly, and in doing so,
have reduced the likelihood that ISPs will develop technology
and mechanisms to reduce or restrict harmful speech online.37
34 The intent of the ATA was to allow American victims to sue terrorist
organizations for money damages, and syphoning their money has the potential to prevent
them from continuing to operate. 137 CONG. REC. S1771-72 daily ed. Feb. 7, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Grassley). Given the key role that social media plays for terrorist
organizations, creating incentives for ISPs to prevent terrorist organizations from utilizing
their services could further hamper terrorist organizations’ abilities to continue to operate,
or at the very least, remove some of their influence; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
35 See CDA 230: Legislative History, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history [https://perma.cc/LEA6-9296] [hereinafter
CDA 230].
36 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
37 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (“But Congress has
made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service
provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by
others. In some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider
community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to
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Absent the threat of a costly legal battle, there are few—if any—
incentives to invest money in solutions that would create a better
online community. Twitter, relying on prior jurisprudence,
utilized Section 230 to completely bar plaintiffs’ claims that
Twitter violated the ATA;38 Section 230 will likely continue to bar
similar claims against social media platforms.39
A. Background and History of Section 230
The CDA “attempt[ed] to regulate obscenity and
indecency online.”40 Section 230 of the CDA, a portion of the law
introduced in 1995 by Representatives Chris Cox (R-CA) and
Ron Wyden (D-OR),41 responded to two similar cases in New
York with conflicting results. In Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.,
the Southern District of New York found that an ISP could not
be held responsible for libel without knowledge of the crime
occurring.42 By contrast, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co, the New York Supreme Court held that since a
website that hosted online bulletin boards moderated its
message boards and deleted some messages for “offensiveness
and bad taste,” the website had become akin to a publisher and
should be held responsible for defamatory postings on the
website.43 Even though the cases had differing results, both
cases demonstrated the courts’ willingness to hold ISPs liable for
content posted on their sites if the ISPs were aware of the
content’s existence. Based on the holdings in Cubby, Inc. and
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., regardless of how the content came to
be, if an ISP was aware of the content, the ISP could be held
liable. The two cases concerned Congress because it wanted
Internet companies to be “free to develop new and innovative
services” and felt that the fear of liability for their users’ content
would lead ISPs to enact regulations that would ultimately chill
online speech.44
Therefore, Congress enacted Section 230(c) of the CDA,
titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of
Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive
material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted.”).
38 Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
39 Farivar, supra note 25.
40 CDA 230, supra note 35.
41 Id.
42 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
43 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *4, *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
44 CDA 230, supra note 35.
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offensive material.”45 Section 230 aimed to “encourage the
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the
Internet.”46 It set out to make sure that Internet companies
would be immune from liability when acting as publishers of
third-party content.47 Although the Supreme Court struck down
the anti-decency portions of the CDA finding that provisions
prohibiting transmission or sending of obscene, indecent, or
patently offensive communications to persons under eighteen
were content-based restrictions on speech that were facially
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment,48 Section 230 and
its liability shield survived.
B. Courts’ Application of Section 230
Section 230 of the CDA states that, “No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”49 While Section 230 does not
exempt ISPs from all exposure to federal criminal liability,50 it
immunizes ISPs in cases where plaintiffs seek to hold the ISP
liable for user-created content.51
The enactment of Section 230 prevented certain legal
norms from applying to online forums.52 For example, though a
newspaper publisher could be held accountable for content it
45 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
46 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of this statutory immunity
is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedomof speech in the newand burgeoning Internetmedium. The imposition of tort liability
on service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress, simply
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part,
to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep
government interference in the medium to a minimum.”).
47 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he telephone
company is not liable as an aider and abettor for tapes or narcotics sold by phone . . . so
a web host cannot be classified as an aider and abettor of criminal activities conducted
through access to the Internet.”); CDA 230, supra note 35; see also Backpage.com LLC v.
Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 233–34 (7th Cir. 2015) (“As our court has explained, interpreting
Section 230(c), ‘an intermediary . . . normally is indifferent to the content of what it
transmits. Even entities that know the information’s content do not become liable for the
sponsor’s deeds. Does a newspaper that carries an advertisement for “escort
services” . . . aid and abet the crime of prostitution, if it turns out that some . . . of the
advertisers make money from that activity?’” (citation omitted)).
48 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
49 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
50 See Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 234 (“It’s true that the Communications
Decency Act does not immunize the credit card companies or Backpage from federal
criminal liability . . . .”) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)).
51 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
52 Id.
682 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:2
published,53 an ISP would be protected from liability when acting
as publisher thanks to Section 230. In practice, Section 230 created
a form of “Internet exceptionalism.”54 Chief Judge J. Harve
Wilkinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit noted that Congress’s decision to reduce the potential tort
claims against ISPs underscores Congress’s ultimate purpose of
promoting free, unfettered speech on the Internet.55
Despite the noble purpose of Section 230, the law failed
to create an ideal online community since ISPs remain immune
from liability even when they make no attempt to self-police for
obscenity or other offensive material.56 Indeed, given Congress’s
intent, courts questioned Section 230(c)’s title since the law failed
to create an incentive for ISPs to act as “Good Samaritan[s].”57
Courts have found the scope of ISP immunity to cover both
publishing and distributing liabilities.58 Publisher liability is very
broad—a publisher can be held liable for anything included within
the publishedmaterial—by contrast, “[d]istributor liability ismuch
more limited” and distributors cannot automatically be held liable
for material they distribute.59 The provision of immunity under
Section 230 is afforded across all manner of ISPs, including to web
hosts,60 email providers,61 and websites serving pure commercial
53 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Congress
decided not to treat providers of interactive computer services like other information
providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio stations, all of which
may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written
or prepared by others.”); accord CDA 230, supra note 35.
54 H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating
Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 369 (2008). “Situated
within the larger debate over Internet governance, the concept of Internet
exceptionalism presumes that cyberspace cannot be confined by physical borders or
controlled by traditional sovereign governments, and thus that cyberlibertarian
communities will emerge in which norms of relationship, thought and expression are yet
to be formed.” Id. at 376.
55 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
56 See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52 (“Congress has conferred immunity from
tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for
obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or
not even attempted.”).
57 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (Judge Easterbrook
asked why “should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive
material end up defeating claims by the victims of tortious . . . conduct?”).
58 Holland, supra note 54, at 374.
59 David Ardia, Primer on Immunity—and Liability—for Third-Party Content
Under Section 230 of Communications Decency Act, BERMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y (Dec. 17, 2007), https://cyber.harvard.edu/node/93965 [https://perma.cc/MKC5-VBQF].
60 See, e.g., GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 655; Doe v. Franco Prods, 2000 WL 816779,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d
409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Section 230 raised as a defense by web-hosting service, but
held not dispositive).
61 See Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.D. 1000, 1003–04 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
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functions.62 By choosing a broad interpretation of the law,63
courts “tipped the scales decisively towards efficiency,” but not
towards decency.64 In essence, Section 230 created a landscape
where ISPs can operate virtually undisturbed by the law, and thus,
there are few, if any, legal mechanisms to ensure they are
operating in a way that benefits the community at large.65 By
providing immunity to ISPs for both publishing and distributing,
Congress left no incentive for ISPs to be innovative to create new
ways to remove indecent material from their services.66
Beyond allowing immunity for publishing and
distributing content, courts interpreted the term “information
content provider”—the class for whom there is no immunity—
broadly, allowing ISPs to modify content but still benefit from
the protections of Section 230.67 Specifically, those who make
“minor alterations” or “take some affirmative steps to edit the
material” provided by another do not become information
content providers as long as the material’s “basic form and
message” remain the same.68 As a result, ISPs remain immune
from suit so long as they do not author or greatly alter the
content in question.69 Indeed, since Twitter, Facebook, and
Google allow users’ to post on their platforms but do not alter
users’ content, those platforms appear almost permanently
immune from suit. If, however, Twitter were to substantially
62 See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 712–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002);
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Stoner v. eBay Inc.,
2000 WL 1705637, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000).
63 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997).
64 Paul Ehrlich, Communications Decency Act 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
401, 402 (2002).
65 For example, in 2016, Facebook earned at least $100,000 in revenue by
selling ads to a Russian company linked to the Kremlin that posted ads to interfere with
the 2016 election. An additional $50,000 in ad revenue is suspected to have been
purchased by Russian companies, but the 2,200 ads bought “had less certain indications
of a Russian connection.” Scott Shane & Vindue Goel, Fake Russian Facebook Accounts
Bought $100,000 in Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/J8HY-
PF7J]. In a regime where Facebook cannot be held liable for the content of these ads,
Facebook had no reason to question whether it should sell ads to this company. Further,
Facebook failed to even realize how these ads were being utilized or the effects they were
having on the population at large. Perhaps with a more robust liability regime, Facebook
would have taken more responsibility over the content being spread over its platform—
content Facebook was profiting from.
66 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Congress has
conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to
self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-
policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted.”).
67 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
68 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003); Donato v. Moldow,
865 A.2d 711, 724 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031).
69 Ehrlich, supra note 64, at 402.
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alter a user’s Tweet, the liability shield would no longer apply
since the suit would be about content authored by the ISP.70
Although Section 230 grants broad immunity, the statute
does not “create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet”71 and
there have been successful cases against ISPs using other
theories of liability. In Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., the plaintiff
sued a website operator for negligent failure to warn, alleging
that the defendant knowingly failed to warn her that two
individuals were using Internet Brands’s website to identify and
lure rape victims.72 Although the plaintiff had posted on the
website, the two individuals had not, the court held that
plaintiff’s claim could move forward since she was not seeking to
hold the defendant liable as a publisher of content.73
In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the plaintiff sued Yahoo!
claiming that she had relied on its promise to remove explicit
photographs her ex-boyfriend had posted online without her
consent.74 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that Section 230 did not preclude the plaintiff’s
promissory estoppel claim because the plaintiff did not “seek to
hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content,
but rather as the counter-party to a contract, as a promisor who
has breached.”75 Since the plaintiff’s theory of liability was based
on Yahoo!’s “manifest intention to be legally obligated to do
something” rather than on its “publishing conduct,” Section 230(c)
did not bar the claim.76 The Barnes court noted that based on
nearly two decades of jurisprudence interpreting Section 230, it is
clear that “what matters is not the name of the cause of action—
defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of
emotional distress—[but] . . . whether the cause of action
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the
‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.”77
In cases arising under the ATA, however, the analysis
should be different. The ATA allows plaintiffs to reach entities a
70 Cf. id. (discussing immunity for ISPs so long as they are not content
authors); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
71 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008).
72 Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 849–50 (9th Cir. 2016).
73 Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff’s negligent failure to warn
claim would not require the defendant “to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it
publishes or monitors such content. . . . Posting or emailing such a warning could be deemed
an act of publishing information, but Section 230(c)(1) bars only liability that treats a website
as a publisher or speaker of content provided by somebody else.” Id. at 851.
74 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009).
75 Id. at 1107.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1101–02.
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step removed from the terrorist organizations so long as the
entity has “knowledge of and intent to further” the terrorist’s
violent criminal acts when providing support.78 The intent of the
ATA is to allow American victims of terror the opportunity to sue
persons giving material support to terrorists for money
damages,79 and the ATA applies to both legal persons and
natural persons alike.80 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that the provisions within the ATA prohibiting material support
to terrorist groups do not violate the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.81
Allowing Section 230 to serve as a complete roadblock to
claims arising under the ATA frustrates the ATA’s purpose.
Further, Section 230’s liability shield removes incentives for
ISPs to develop mechanisms that will prevent terrorist content
from being disseminated through their services.
C. Fields v. Twitter Expands Section 230’s Application
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act served as a
complete roadblock for the litigants inFields. Absent an amendment
altering the scope of the law, future litigants will struggle to
successfully bring claims under a civil provision of the ATA.82
In November 2015, two U.S. government contractors
were shot and killed while working “at a law enforcement
training center in Amman, Jordan.”83 The shooter was a
Jordanian police officer named Abu Zaid, and in subsequent
statements ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, stating,
“Do not provoke the Muslims more than this, especially
recruited and supported of the Islamic State. The more your
aggression against the Muslims, the more our determination
and revenge . . . . [T]ime will turn thousands of supporters of the
caliphate on Twitter and others to wolves.”84
78 John D. Shipman, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the
New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 539 (2008) (quoting Boim v.
Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(d)(1) (West 2016).
79 138 CONG. REC. 33628–29 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Grassley) (“[The ATA] will allow the victims [of terrorism] to pursue renegade terrorist
organizations and their leaders, and go after the resource that keeps them in business—
their money.”).
80 DiGregoria, supra note 26, at 376; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(d)(1); accord 1 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2012) (defining “person” to “include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”).
81 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010).
82 See generallyFields v. Twitter, Inc., 200F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding
that Section 230 of the CDA precluded plaintiffs from bringing claims against Twitter).
83 Id. at 966.
84 Id. at 967 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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Instead of alleging that ISIS recruited Abu Zaid through
Twitter, the plaintiffs sought to hold Twitter liable on the basis
of Twitter violating the ATA85 by knowingly providing material
support to ISIS.86 Plaintiffs asserted that Twitter’s material
support included allowing “ISIS to use its social network as a
tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and
attracting new recruits.”87 ISIS was able to spread its
propaganda and incite fear, according to plaintiffs, by using
Twitter to disseminate its official media publications, including
publicizing graphic photos and videos of its terrorist feats,
thereby spreading propaganda and inciting fear.88 Plaintiff’s also
alleged that ISPs used Twitter to interact with potential
recruits.89 Beyond Abu Zaid’s one act of terrorism, plaintiffs
further alleged that Twitter’s “material support has been
85 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (“Any national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her
estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United
States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the
suit, including attorney’s fees.”).
86 Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 965. Sections 2339A and 2339B prohibit the
knowing provision of “material support or resources” for terrorist activities or foreign
terrorist organizations. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(a), 2339B(a)(1) (2012). “[M]aterial support or
resources means any property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including
“communications equipment.” Id. §§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4). After ISIS captured Maaz
al-Kassasbeh, the group launched a Twitter campaign in an attempt to receive ideas for
his method of execution. Subsequently, ISIS distributed a twenty-two-minute video of
his killing through a Twitter account in February 2015. Although Abu Zaid’s brother
said he was “moved” by the execution, plaintiffs did not allege that Abu Zaid viewed the
video on Twitter or at all, and further “[the] [p]laintiffs [did] not allege that ISIS
recruited or communicated with Abu Zaid over Twitter.” Id. at 966–67.
87 Fields First Amended Complaint, supra note 23, at 1; see also Fields, 200 F.
Supp. 3d at 965.
88 See Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 965. Indeed, in December 2015, ISIS was
circulating “60 individual unique photographs” everyday as part of its propaganda
activity to increase morale, recruit supporters, and sustain its momentum in creating
the Caliphate. The ISIS Propaganda Slowdown, supra note 10.
89 See Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 965; see also Fields First Amended Complaint,
supra note 23, at 1. While it used to be time-consuming and costly to recruit someone to
terror, Twitter has provided an avenue through which fighters can upload photos of what
they are doing in real time in order to encourage people to join their cause. Auster, supra
note 3. “The reach of the Islamic State’s recruiting effort has been multiplied by an enormous
cadre of operators on social media. [It] maintains a 24-hour online operation, and its
effectiveness is vastly extended by larger rings of sympathetic volunteers and fans who pass
on its messages and viewpoint, reeling in potential recruits, analysts say.” Rukmini
Callimachi, ISIS and the Lonely Young American, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html [https://
perma.cc/9DQZ-XHU5]. “Nationwide, more than 80 Americans, mostly young Muslim men,
have been arrested for seeking to join the group. Most of those arrested have said they were
seduced by ISIS recruiters on social media.” Dina Temple-Raston, ISIS Trial May Offer
A Window Into How The Extremist Group Recruits, NPR (May 10, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/10/477482627/isis-trial-may-offer-a-window-
into-how-the-extremist-group-recruits [https://perma.cc/4975-H5DK].
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instrumental to the rise of ISIS and has enabled it to carry out
numerous terrorist attacks.”90
Without reaching an opinion on the merits of plaintiffs’
claims, the court dismissed the suit, finding the claims barred by
Section 230(c), the “protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material” provision of the CDA.91 Although
plaintiffs contended that their claims were not based on the
contents of tweets or Twitter’s failure to remove tweets but rather
based on the provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS to begin with,
the court found such a claim to be problematic.92 This is because
the arguments raised to oppose Twitter’smotion to dismiss differed
from the allegations in the First Amended Complaint (FAC).93
Even if the plaintiffs had alleged that Twitter’s liability
was based on its provision of accounts to ISIS users in the FAC,
their claims still would have been barred. In determining
whether Section 230(c)(1) is appropriate in any given case, a
court must first determine if the plaintiff is alleging liability
based on “the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or
speaker.’”94 If it is, Section 230 applies and it precludes liability
for hosting third-party content.95 The Fields court found that
provision of accounts falls within the ambit of an ISP’s
publishing functions since it relates to determining the format
and scope of the content to appear online,96 and Section 230(c)(1)
protects ISPs from publisher liability.97 The court thus dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims with leave to amend,98 but in the wake of Fields
it will certainly be an uphill battle for plaintiffs to successfully
90 Fields First Amended Complaint, supra note 23, at 1; see also Fields, 200 F.
Supp. 3d at 965.
91 Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 968.
92 Id. at 970.
93 Id.
94 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009). Nothing in
this case indicated that the provision of accounts theory was beyond the scope of
Twitter’s publishing conduct. Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
95 Id.
96 Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016).
97 See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a
given piece of content.”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“[D]ecisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content . . . [are]
actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.”); Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[D]etermin[ing] whether or not to prevent [the] posting” of third-party material
online is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by the CDA.); Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability necessarily
precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among
proffered material”).
98 Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
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hold social media companies liable for the consequences of
terrorists’ propaganda dissemination on ISPs’ websites.99
D. Section 230’s Application in the Wake of Fields
Though the Fields decision expanded the scope of Section
230(c) to apply even in cases arising under the ATA,100 the case
led to at least one positive development.101 In its wake, social
media companies increased efforts to find and suspend accounts
linked with terrorism.102 Such activity, however, is insufficient.
In the event that terrorist material is not removed, plaintiffs
seeking to hold companies liable for the material that leads to
violent actions103 will still have to plead their claim in such a way
as to avoid Section 230’s liability shield,104 and doing so appears
nearly impossible.
An example of one such case isGonzalez v. Twitter.105 The
father of the only American victim among the 130 killed in
coordinated attacks at a Parisian soccer stadium, concert venue,
and café sued Twitter, Facebook, and Google.106 He alleged that
the three ISPs provided material support to ISIS since they
“knowingly permitted the terrorist group ISIS to use their social
networks as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising
funds and attracting new recruits.”107 Because the complaint’s
allegations are similar to Fields, it appears unlikely that
Gonzalez will move past the motion to dismiss stage.108
99 Farivar, supra note 25.
100 See supra Section I.C.; see also The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://
support.twitter.com/articles/18311 [https://perma.cc/A794-G6JC]. Perhaps moving forward,
courts will view Twitter rules as a promise made by Twitter that would allow plaintiffs to
bring claims under the theory of promissory estoppel, similar toBarnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.
3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
101 Woolf, supra note 9; see also Jeff John Roberts, Twitter Shut Down 235,000
Terrorist Accounts This Year, FORTUNE (Aug. 18, 2016 12:56 PM), http://fortune.com/
2016/08/18/twitter-terrorists/ [https://perma.cc/6BZB-EN4Y].
102 Woolf, supra note 9. Between February and August, Twitter reported that it
shut down 235,000 accounts and “raised its daily suspension rate by 80% since [2015].”
Roberts, supra note 101.
103 Kate Knibbs, Extreme Moderation: An Organization Says it has a Solution
to Curb Terrorist Activity on Social Media. Why Won’t Facebook, Twitter, Google, and
Other Tech Powers Sign on?, RINGER (Jan. 17, 2017), https://theringer.com/curbing-
terrorist-social-media-activity-facebook-twitter-google-601ff9684068#.z5dy9vb8n
[https://perma.cc/8923-MZ2T].
104 See Farivar, supra note 25.
105 See generally Gonzalez v. Twitter Complaint, supra note 23.
106 Id.
107 Jacob Bogage, Family of ISIS Paris attack victim sues Google, Facebook and
Twitter, WASH. POST (June 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2016/06/16/family-of-isis-paris-attack-victim-sues-google-facebook-and-twitter/ [https://
perma.cc/W8NZ-6HDG].
108 Cf.Gonzalez v. Twitter Complaint, supra note 23 with Fields First Amended
Complaint, supra note 23; see also Farivar, supra note 25.
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After the Pulse Nightclub attack, the families of three
victims brought suit against Twitter, Facebook, and Google in
Crosby et al v. Twitter, Inc. et al.109 Plaintiffs alleged that Twitter
and other social media companies knowingly provided material
support to ISIS110 since individuals associated with the terrorist
group called for donations via Twitter, even going so far as to
promote “donation tiers” on the platform.111 Further, the sites
placed advertisements alongside ISIS videos, and thus
materially benefitted from hosting terrorist content on their
servers.112 On April 28, 2017, Twitter filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that Section 230 of the CDA barred plaintiffs’ claims—
notably, Fields v. Twitterwas the first case cited on Twitter’s list
of “controlling or most appropriate authorities.”113
Perhaps the judges hearing the Gonzalez and Crosby
suits will reach different results, but a different interpretation
of the law is unlikely because of the consistent determination
that Section 230 of the CDA bars claims against ISPs so long as
they have not authored or substantially edited the material. It
is necessary to amend the law to prevent Section 230’s liability
shield from precluding judgments in cases brought under the
ATA. Plaintiff claims should not be immediately dismissed in
cases where courts find that even the inaction of an ISP is the
equivalent of providing or attempting to provide material
support to a terrorist organization.
II. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT TO PRECLUDEUSE OF SECTION 230(C)’S
LIABILITY SHIELD IN CASES ARISINGUNDER THE ATA
Even though Section 230 was enacted to “encourage
online platforms to be proactive about filtering, blocking and
sanitizing content,” the liability shield has removed incentives
to innovate.114 Because of the shield, the cost of implementing
109 Crosby v. Twitter Complaint, supra note 23; Lotan, supra note 20.
110 Crosby v. Twitter Complaint, supra note 23.
111 Id. at 12. An ISIS-linked account sought donations for weapons and tweeted
that “if 50 dinars is [sic] donated, equivalent to 50 sniper rounds, one will receive a ‘silver
status.’ Likewise, if 100 dinars is [sic] donated, which buys eight mortar rounds, the
contributor will earn the title of ‘gold status’ donor.” Id. “[O]ver 26,000 Saudi Riyals
(almost $7,000) were donated” as a result of that tweet. Id.
112 Id. at 13.
113 Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at ii, 12–22, Crosby v. Twitter, Inc. et al, No. 2:16-cv-14406 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 19, 2016), ECF No. 37.
114 Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, TECH CRUNCH
(Sept. 29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-liability-
shield/ [https://perma.cc/FF5K-L3KT].
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tools that could mitigate the impact of online terrorist recruiting
outweigh the benefits to social media companies because they
remain immune from suit no matter what actions they take or
choose not to take.115
The current geopolitical climate calls for a renewed look at
how courts determine what constitutes incitement.116 Terrorist
communications on online forums should now fall under the
incitement standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio and ISPs should be held liable for allowing
such communications to be distributed through their platforms.117
A. Congress Should Amend Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act
At the time of its enactment over two decades ago,118
when the Internet was in its infancy and Mark Zuckerberg was
just twelve years old,119 there was no way for Congress to
anticipate that the Internet would be utilized by a terrorist
group that did not yet exist.120 Even if Congress intended for the
scope of Section 230 to apply to claims under the ATA, the law
was not enacted with the knowledge of how terrorist groups
could and would utilize the Internet to recruit members and
cause immense harm. Yet this is exactly what has happened.
Just as the CDA does not exempt ISPs from exposure to
federal criminal liability,121 Section 230(c) should not function as
115 Id.
116 Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/
2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html
[https://perma.cc/6HZ7-TGYX] (noting that the current legal landscape is insufficient to
address the threats terrorist pose through their online activities); Cass R. Sunstein,
Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 2015, 12:38 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-state-s-challenge-to-free-speech
[https://perma.cc/WS7J-Z2MW] (same).
117 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
118 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56,
137 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 230 (2012)); see also Ehrlich, supra note 64, at 402.
119 Mark Zuckerberg, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Mark-Zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/2LU6-UYMZ].
120 Justin Worland, President Obama Is Not the ‘Founder of ISIS.’ Here’s Who
Really Started It, TIME (Aug. 11, 2016), http://time.com/4448218/donald-trump-isis-
founder-president-obama-zarqawi [https://perma.cc/H73L-ZR4N]. In 2013 Abu Musab al
Zarqai cut off ties with al-Qaeda and created ISIS to unite the Arab world under a single
Sunni regime. Id.; see also Auster, supra note 3; Callimachi, supra note 89; Temple-
Raston, supra note 89.
121 Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 234 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It’s true that
the Communications Decency Act does not immunize the credit card companies or
Backpage from federal criminal liability . . . .” (citing 47 U.S.C. 230(e)(1) (2012))). Section
230(e)(1), however, only excludes federal criminal prosecutions, not civil lawsuits
predicated on federal criminal law. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL
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an immediate bar to claims brought against ISPs when those
claims are brought pursuant to the ATA—even when ISPs are
mere publishers of third-party content. Because social media
companies cannot be sued for damages for content provided by
another user, there is no economic incentive to innovate to solve
the issue of terrorist propaganda being widely distributed
through ISPs.122 Indeed, even though nonprofit companies are
ready and willing to develop systems to identify and block
terrorist content,123 social media companies are not eager to take
advantage of such systems.124 More likely than not, this is
because restricting communications of any kind runs contrary to
the business models of social media companies. This note
proposes adding a subsection to Section 230(c)(1).125 The
amended statute would read as follows:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” Blocking and Screening of
Offensive Material
(1) Treatment of Publisher or Speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.
(A) This section shall not apply in cases arising under the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333.126
Allowing claims under the ATA to proceed to trial would
create the incentive of avoiding costly litigation and would
encourage ISPs to develop creative solutions to reduce the
amount of terrorist propaganda online.
B. The Incitement Standard
Since the purpose of Section 230 is to “protect[] vitally
important free speech interests,”127 any change to the law
would likely result in challenges to the constitutionality of the
3813758, at *22 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (“Section 230 does not limit anyone’s ability to
bring criminal or civil actions against actual wrongdoers . . . .”).
122 See supra note 138 and surrounding text.
123 Hany Farid partnered with the Counter Extremism Project to create a system
to flag terrorist photos. It would automatically remove “the worst of the worst” online
content, like beheading videos. Social media, companies, however, “balked” when the
Counter Extremism Project proposed this hashing tool to them. Knibbs, supra note 103.
124 Id.
125 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
126 Id.
127 Eric Goldman, Big Win For Free Speech Online in Backpage Lawsuit,
FORBES (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/03/17/big-win-
for-free-speech-online-in-backpage-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/K8RZ-CP2X].
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alteration. But speech that intends to incite and is likely to incite
“imminent lawless action” is not protected by the First
Amendment.128 The proposed amendment to Section 230 would
pass constitutional muster because even though the Supreme
Court in 1969 could not have anticipated the potential imminent
threat that violent discourse could pose through the Internet when
it enunciated the current incitement standard in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, the Court’s holding supports the premise that terrorist
propaganda is not protected by the First Amendment.129
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”130 Accordingly,
content-based regulations of speech are viewed as inherently
suspect and analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard.131
Content-neutral regulations of speech aimed at the medium
rather than the message are analyzed under an intermediate
standard of scrutiny.132 Although the First Amendment
encourages protection of all speech, even speech society finds
abhorrent,133 certain categories of speech are viewed as so
contrary to the purposes of the First Amendment that content-
based restrictions of speech are permissible.134 Speech that
incites violence is one such category.
Under the most recent iteration of the incitement
standard, a state may permissibly regulate speech that
advocates violence only if the speech (1) intends to incite and (2)
is likely to incite imminent illegal activity.135 Under the
Brandenburg test, the government cannot punish speech unless
the speech is likely to trigger “imminent lawless action.”136
A key problem in combatting the issue of terrorist speech
with counter-speech is that counter-speech is not likely to
128 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
129 See id.
130 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000); see also CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND
LIBERTIES 823, 826–27 (5th ed. 2016).
132 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
133 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
134 MASSEY, supra note 131, at 829. “The principle categories of unprotected
speech are obscenity, child pornography, speech that incites the immediate commission
of a crime, and fighting words.” Id.
135 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
136 Id. This test ensures strong protection for almost all speech, however, it also
creates a situation where “[i]f a person were to say ‘The U.S. government should be
overthrown’ or ‘The more acts of terrorism, the better,’ or ‘All Muslims should join ISIS,’
she couldn’t be punished unless those statements were likely to produce imminent
lawless action.” Sunstein, supra note 116.
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succeed in quelling recruitment efforts.137 The United States “is
seen as lacking credibility by key members of the target
audience of people who are vulnerable to IS[IS]’s recruitment
tactics.”138 In addition, although the imminence of violent
terrorist action may be called into question under the
Brandenburg formula,139 there is no question that terrorist
speech over the Internet does create a genuine risk of danger.140
“[S]tudies now posit that mass killings are contagious.”141
Moreover, terrorist groups have become increasingly adept at
using social media platforms to “lure young men and women to
their mission—without having to risk . . . capture . . . on U.S.
soil,” thus creating a “radicalization echo chamber” that has
“given rise to a[n] historic and unprecedented danger from
foreign radicalization and recruitment.”142
The right to free speech is the cornerstone of a democratic
society and governments should consider all options before
censoring speech. Despite its importance, this note is not the first
instance where the breadth of the free speech right has been
challenged. Judge Learned Hand believed that free speech did not
protect explicit or direct incitement to violence—evenwhen no harm
was imminent—and he rejected the formulaic “clear and present
danger” test.143 Instead he advocated for the test to be applied on a
case-by-case basis.144 Today, legal theorists such as Cass Sunstein
137 Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114 Congress
92, 98 (2015) [hereinafter Jihad 2.0] (statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior
Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
138 Id.
139 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
140 For example, during the summer of 2016, a French terrorist suspect killed a
police officer and his partner and recorded a Facebook Live video from within his home.
Knibbs, supra note 103. By the time Facebook shut down his account, “the video had
already been ripped and disseminated by sympathizers, journalists, and rubberneckers.”
Id. The Tsarnaev brothers who orchestrated the Boston Marathon bombing “learned how
to create pressure cooker bombs from Inspire, an online magazine published by the Yemen-
based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Azmat Khan, The Magazine that “Inspired” the
Boston Bombers, FRONTLINE (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
the-magazine-that-inspired-the-boston-bombers/ [https://perma.cc/QD3G-VXZ3]. Inspire’s
“most meaningful innovation has been to combine both the incitement to jihad with the
how-to of terrorism.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
141 Ryan J. Reilly, Domestic Terrorists Organizing Online Are ‘Real Threat,’ DOJ
Warns, HUFF. POST (Oct. 14, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
domestic-hate-groups-online-doj_us_561d7491e4b0c5a1ce60f874 [https://perma.cc/PPR5-
RUPK]. The Internet allows individuals to organize in ways that previously could only be
done through formal meetings. Social media allows people to connect and allows messages
to be disseminated by simply clicking send. Id.
142 Posner, supra note 116.
143 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
144 Id.
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and Eric Posner advocate for a reconsideration of the current
incitement standard in light of the current geopolitical climate.145
It is appropriate to reexamine the incitement standard
by reviewing the Supreme Court’s holding in Dennis v. United
States, since the tense sociopolitical climate when that case
arose mirrors that of modern times. In Dennis the Court refused
to accept the conclusion that the government should not have to
wait until plans are about to be put into motion before it is
allowed to act.146 If the government knows that a group “aiming
at its overthrow” is working to spread its message and persuade
others to join its cause, then the government is permitted—and
in fact required—to take action.147 Dennis was decided in 1951 as
the Cold War was heating up,148 and because of that tense
sociopolitical climate, the Court held that the distribution of
Communist party recruitingmaterials was sufficiently dangerous
to constitute incitement.149
The present-day situation is arguably wrought with even
more peril. The government is fully aware of ISIS’s use of social
media for indoctrination and recruitment.150 Yet the government
is barred from acting under the speech-protective incitement
standard enunciated in Brandenburg.151 Further, encouraging
social media companies to develop better mechanisms to prevent
terrorists from using their platforms to disseminate their
messages would burden far less speech compared to what the
Court allowed in Dennis.152 Importantly, the Brandenburg Court
would likely support the proposed application of the incitement
standard to terrorist propaganda.153
Another practical interpretation of the standard would be
a combination of Judge Learned Hand’s approach with a
145 Posner, supra note 116; Sunstein, supra note 116.
146 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
147 Id.
148 Geoffrey R. Stone, ISIS, Fear, and the Freedom of Speech, HUFF. POST: THE
BLOG (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/isis-fear-
and-the-freedom_b_8864050.html [https://perma.cc/2378-GP5M].
149 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509, 516–17.
150 See, e.g., Scott Shane, Matt Apuzzo, & Eric Schmitt, Americans Attracted to
ISIS Find an ‘Echo Chamber’ on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/us/americans-attracted-to-isis-find-an-echo-chamber-on-
social-media.html [https://perma.cc/EA82-TTJ9] (A lonely and bored seventeen-year-old
in Virginia discovered ISIS online and was gradually drawn into its world. Though he
did not start out as a jihadi, he was made into one through the Internet, and was
ultimately convicted of the crime of material support of terrorism and sentenced to
eleven years in prison after he taught ISIS supports how to transfer funds secretly and
drove an ISIS recruit to the airport.).
151 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 147 and surrounding next.
153 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, n.2 (1969) (per curiam).
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balancing approach.154 “If (and only if) people are explicitly inciting
violence, perhaps their speech doesn’t deserve protection when
(and onlywhen) it produces a genuine risk to public safety, whether
imminent or not.”155 Under this formulation of the incitement
standard, intermediaries could be held liable for allowing the
dissemination of videos like ISIS execution videos—these videos
are explicit incitements to violence and they are used to inspire
others and call people to violence.
Today, it is impossible to know when a danger is
imminent, especially in the age of “lone wolf” terrorists.156
Between 2014 and 2015, there were terror attacks in six
countries, all “in the name of radical Islam.”157 In those that took
place in Canada and Australia, there is evidence that the attacks
were carried out “by a jihadi . . . using social media.”158 It is
critical to characterize ISIS-related social media accounts as
accounts attempting to incite others to violence, because failing
to limit their presence online will allow the threat posed by such
terrorist speech to continue to grow without interference.
A greater liability regime would cut off a key lifeline for
ISIS and other terrorist organizations.159 The Internet has
become “a dark playground for extremist groups like ISIS”
where they “propagandize, radicalize, recruit new members and
commit cyber jihad.”160 Moreover, ISIS has become “entirely
dependent on the success of its messaging” on the Internet.161 By
154 Sunstein, supra note 116.
155 Id.
156 Katie Worth, Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—And More
Deadly, FRONTLINE (July 14, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-
wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-and-more-deadly/ [https://perma.cc/NMN5-
BV77] (Lone wolfs are “motivated by amixture of political and personal grievance” and “dr[a]w
some of their radicalization online.” In addition, they are difficult to track because they
“plot[] the[ir] attack[s] on their own, without direction from or coordination with others.”).
157 Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism, supra note 11, at 7
(page 4 of linked written statement of The Hon. Mark D. Wallace, CEO, Counter
Extremism Project).
158 Id. The attacker used social media either to “spread content pushed out by
others, or to leave messages . . . justif[ying] . . . his actions.” Id.
159 Some theorists caution us about this approach saying that “countering
propaganda is one thing—criminalizing the receipt and distribution of that propaganda is
another.” David G. Post, Protecting the First Amendment in the Internet Age, WASH. POST
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/21/
protecting-the-first-amendment-in-the-internet-age/?utm_term=.083b23dce968 [https://
perma.cc/BGP3-FHBV]. It is important to mention that this note’s solution does not
propose criminalizing the receipt or distribution of propaganda—but rather creating a
liability regime wherein ISPs could be held liable for civil damages under the ATA.
160 Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism, supra note 11, at 7
(page 2 of linked written statement of The Hon. Mark D. Wallace, CEO, Counter
Extremism Project).
161 Jihad 2.0, supra note 137, at 90 (statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross,
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies). In fact, the pattern in American
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revisiting the interpretation of the incitement standard,
Congress could constitutionally create an exemption from
Section 230 of the CDA to preclude use of the liability shield in
cases arising under the ATA. This would increase incentives for
ISPs to innovate and develop new solutions to avoid liability by
combatting the threat of terror on social media.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH AMENDING
SECTION 230
Amending Section 230 would create an avenue for legal
redress for family members of victims of terrorist attacks while
creating incentives for ISPs to develop technology to prevent
terrorist propaganda from being posted on their platforms. This
new liability regime, however, would not be without its potential
externalities since a “hard-and-fast rule against any . . . kind of
content . . . shut[s] down the opportunity for discussion around
that sort of material.”162
Some theorists argue that “[u]sing the law to force
Facebook and Twitter to do more to block ISIS propaganda
would make sense” but such a solution would not solve all
problems.163 They claim that as soon as ISPs “shut down”
terrorist communications, it would be easy for jihadis to simply
find new websites to spread their message.164 For example, when
Twitter began to shut down more ISIS-related accounts,
extremists fled to the Telegram app for more privacy and to
prevent themselves from being exiled from all social media
platforms.165 Indeed, the pace at which terrorists find new places
to communicate makes it significantly more difficult for ISPs “to
keep track of billions of communications.”166 Allowing social media
companies to continue with the status quo, however, would be an
improper solution because “extremists have been more agile,
aggressive and insidious in their use of social media platforms
history “is that in times of national emergency, certain limits on speech will be tolerated.”
Posner, supra note 116.
162 Why it’s so hard to fight extremist propaganda online, supra note 10.
163 Posner, supra note 116.
164 Id.
165 Nick Robins-Early,How Telegram Became the App of Choice for ISIS, HUFF.
POST (May 24, 2017, 5:22 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-telegram-app_
us_59259254e4b0ec129d3136d5 [https://perma.cc/XEM7-ZD3Q]; see also Elias Groll,
Twitter Suspended Far Fewer Terrorist Accounts in First Half of 2017, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Sept. 19, 2017, 12:46 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/19/twitter-suspended-far-
fewer-terrorist-accounts-in-first-half-of-2017/ [https://perma.cc/6PHH-VP8T].
166 Posner, supra note 116.
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than governments and the private sector have been in tracking,
stopping and preventing them from hijacking the online world.”167
Others argue that the government should not impose
restrictions on what speech can be disseminated over social
media.168Any socialmedia company could proactively choose to ban
pro-ISIS propaganda because the First Amendment does not apply
to privately owned websites.169 Indeed, “YouTube now deputizes
some human-rights groups as ‘trusted flaggers’ to identify ISIS
content; Twitter has banned ‘indirect threats of violence’; [and]
Facebook proactively removes known jihadists from its service.”170
Despite these efforts, the attacks have persisted, and the threat
terrorist groups pose through their Internet activity has not
lessened. Even as they were losing territory in Iraq, ISIS continued
to post “about [twenty] or [twenty-five] unique images” per day.171
This statistic demonstrates that self-policing is not enough to
combat ISIS’s online presence.
In addition, Facebook, Twitter, and Google already ban
violent threats in their “Terms of Service,” but typically do not
take down content unless and until forced to do so.172 “Doing
takedowns or removing content goes very much against what
they want their platform to do, which is to bring on as much
content and discussion as possible because the more content
that’s there, the more discussion that’s there, the more revenue
they can generate for their business . . . .”173 Twitter’s
dismissiveness of the issue of violent extremists utilizing their
platform is exemplified in a quote by a Twitter official who said,
“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter . . . .”174 It
even appears that ISPs may be profiting by strategically placing
ads alongside ISIS content on their sites.175 Twitter, Facebook,
and Google all target advertisements based on viewers, and their
167 Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism, supra note 11, at 7
(page 2 of linked written statement of The Hon. Mark D. Wallace, CEO, Counter
Extremism Project).
168 See Post, supra note 159.
169 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law” (emphasis added)); see
also Laura Sydell, Pro-ISIS Messages Create Dilemma For Social Media Companies,
NPR: ALL TECH. CONSIDERED (Jan. 29, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
alltechconsidered/2015/01/29/382435536/pro-isis-messages-create-dilemma-for-social-
media-companies [https://perma.cc/XP54-CQ4D] (“[T]he First Amendment does not apply to
privately owned websites . . . .”).
170 Singer & Brooking, supra note 2.
171 The ISIS Propaganda Slowdown, supra note 10.
172 Sydell, supra note 169.
173 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
174 Jenna McLaughlin, Twitter Is Not At War With ISIS. Here’s Why,
MOTHERJONES (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/
twitter-isis-war-ban-speech [https://perma.cc/X4VA-TMAM].
175 Crosby v. Twitter Complaint, supra note 23, at 36.
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profits are allegedly “enhanced by charging advertisers extra for
targeting advertisements at viewers upon knowledge of the
viewer and the content being viewed.”176
Social media companies are faced with complex criticism
because they “are being asked to do more to stop the terrorists,”
while the government is asking them to “let some of the propaganda
to remain” in order to track jihadis.177 Law enforcement officials
want to use the propaganda since they are able to extract
information from social media networks in ways that “go beyond
traditional investigative techniques.”178 While it may be important
for social media companies to keep content up that is useful for law
enforcement, they must do so in a way that makes it difficult for
alienated and vulnerable youth to find the content.179
One way to do so would be through anti-terrorist
advertising. Recently, one of Google’s subsidiaries, Jigsaw, created
a program to place advertising along search results frequently used
by ISIS sympathizers to educate them and undo ISIS
brainwashing.180 The program, however, would not be used to track
the sympathizers or further identify ISIS sympathizers.181 It would
only be used to educate.182 In theory, this program could be
immensely helpful in fighting ISIS if it is able to successfully strike
at ISIS’s ability to recruit fighters online.183 In reality, though,
watching videos online once would not be enough—users have to
continuously return to the site and, ultimately, users must make
a conscious choice to turn away from terrorism.184 Though the
standard remedy for speech that society abhors is counter-
speech,185 it simply does not work effectively in a context such as
this one.
Further, even if counter-speech could be effective,
families of victims of terrorist attacks should, at the very least,
be able to move their lawsuits against social media companies
176 Id. at 36–37.
177 Sydell, supra note 169.
178 Id. In addition, the State Department engages in counter tweeting as an
important part of the anti-ISIS campaign started by its counterterrorism
communications unit wherein State Department tweeters look for ISIS tweets and
respond with messages that highlight ISIS atrocities. McLaughlin, supra note 174.
179 Sydell, supra note 169.
180 See Andy Greenberg, Google’s Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS Recruits,
WIRED (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-
recruits/ [https://perma.cc/QX8S-CR7P].
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Singer & Brooking, supra note 2;Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media
War, supra note 2.
184 See Greenberg, supra note 180.
185 Stone, supra note 148.
2018] SECTION 230 & ONLINE TERRORIST RECRUITMENT 699
beyond the motion to dismiss stage. The proposed amendment is
the only avenue through which that would be possible.
CONCLUSION
It is time for Congress to revisit Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act to preclude applicability of the
liability shield in cases arising under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Upon challenge, the Supreme Court should uphold the amended
law as consistent with First Amendment principles since, in
today’s geopolitical climate, terrorist recruitment creates a clear
and present danger. No longer should companies automatically
defeat claims on the grounds that they did not post or edit the
material. The families of the victims of terrorist attacks deserve
a form of legal redress when the attackers are indoctrinated
through social media. ISPs appear to be complicit in the harm
since they are not acting as “Good Samaritan[s]”186 when they
fail to take sufficient measures to combat a known threat—
ISIS’s use of their platform to encourage others to join their
terrorist movement.
There is no doubt that Congress and the courts should
proceed with caution before altering the legal sphere to place
content-based restrictions on speech. Even so, it would be
irresponsible to not address this issue as there is a clear tension
between individuals seeking to use media platforms to exercise
their First Amendment rights and those who utilize those same
platforms to incite others to commit violent acts.187
“Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”188 is a
founding tenet of this country, and it is time this nation places a
higher value on “Life” than the economic interests of interactive
service providers.
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